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Detente Is Said to Give the K.G.B. a Bigger Work Load

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WASHINGTON, June 1—The K.G.B., the Soviet Union's security and intelligence organization, has taken on some new foreign assignments and a bigger work load at home as a result of East-West détente, Western espionage specialists say.

While détente has increased the ability of the K.G.B.—the initials stand for the Russian words for Committee of State Security—to infiltrate Western countries, it has also given it more work at home keeping surveillance over the larger number of foreigners moving around the Soviet Union.

For the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are similarly occupied.

The Soviet Union, the espionage specialists said, has 1,083 nationals working in the United States as diplomats and trade representatives, whereas 10 years ago, there were 450 Soviet citizens in such roles.

Thousands of Soviet and East European trade representatives are visiting the United States, and the number of East European student visitors and East European seamen here is up.

Counterintelligence officials assume that 40 per cent of the Soviet diplomats in the United States are full-time intelligence officers. It is assumed that this may rise as high as 75 per cent in other countries.

'Broadening of the Base'

"It means a broadening of the base," a counterintelligence official here remarked. "It makes the totality of the United States a target. Their operations are always damned good and their technology is first-rate—very good trade-craft."

But there is no comparison between the situation of the Committee of State Security and that of the Central Intelligence Agency in terms of the United States agency's ordeal. Congressional and executive investigations, according to an informed Administration official.

The K.G.B., he said, has "no less forces and no less budget." "I don't want to paint it 12 feet high," he added, "but it is still alive and well and plays a very major role."

"The K.G.B. is praised, not attacked in Moscow," he said. Around Washington these days, such statements are not made about the C.I.A.

Broadly, the K.G.B. combines the domestic work of the F.B.I. and the foreign intelligence-gathering of the C.I.A. It is, the secret police in the Soviet Union and the intelligence agency in foreign work.

"They provide the cement that holds the whole thing together," an analyst remarked of the K.G.B. With a degree of professional admiration, he added: "If I had their system, then it is the only way I would do it—to have a K.G.B. I see it as part of the main show, an integral and well-integrated part of Soviet society. They are not a freak show."

3 Instruments of Power

In the Soviet Union the K.G.B. has three main instruments of power, as far as the Western analysts can determine.

The Communist party's Politburo, the Communist party is politburo by the K.G.B. chairman, Yuri V. Andropov; control of all essential communications networks and code used in the country, and supervision of the 175,000 border guards assigned to protect the frontiers. No Western intelligence agency is known to have such pervasive powers.

Outside the Soviet Union, the K.G.B. operates much as do other espionage organizations, although it has greater manpower and more sophisticated technology than most.

Of its estimated total of 420,000 employees, the K.G.B. has about 10,000 officers assigned to foreign operations, of whom 2,500 are abroad. Between 50,000 and 80,000 officers are assigned to internal security work, Western specialists believe.

By contrast, the Central Intelligence Agency, which focuses on foreign activities, has about 16,000 employees, of whom 4,000 work abroad. The F.B.I., dealing with internal security, has 19,500 employees, of whom 8,600 are listed as special agents.

In the judgement of K.G.B.'s Western counterparts, its officers are much more security-conscious than Western agencies.

As gleaned from some of the 15 K.G.B. officers who have defected to the West in the last 20 years the following picture emerged.

Only One Notebook

The Soviet intelligence officers keep almost no files in the field. They destroy copies of telegrams received at the "residence"—a legal cover station such as an embassy—with in 24 hours.

Only the "rezident" (chief of a station) may keep a small notebook. The sheets are numbered and the notes are handwritten. When he is sending a report it is photographed and the film is placed in a boobytrapped cassette and sent by diplomatic pouch to Moscow. There must be receipts at each end. This creates a virtually unbreakable security system.

K.G.B. personnel at home tend to keep to themselves. This is explained in part by Western specialists as a result of the hierarchical system of the

K.G.B. Officers have military-style rank—from lieutenant to general—but are paid five to six times more than the equivalent rank in the armed forces.

But the rank system, a specialist said, creates "a lot of incest and infighting—backstabbing because of rank."

The K.G.B. is also "extremely compartmentalized," he added, even in comparison with Western intelligence organizations.

Although K.G.B. officers permeate Soviet society, including the armed forces, in which they play the sole counterintelligence role, they tend to be mavericks, according to a Western expert. They have more defectors than we do," he added.

They are also feared throughout the Soviet Union, although not as much as during the rule of Stalin. But ordinary Soviet people would no more think of talking critically in public about the K.G.B. than they would of disrobing in front of Lenin's mausoleum.

One reason for continued fear of the K.G.B. is its large and still active "wanted list" of Soviet political enemies. A 460-page document contains abstracts on 1,132 Soviet citizens, is stamped "sovershenno sekretno" or "top secret."

Nureyev

It lists such seeming innocents as Rudolf Nureyev, the dancer, who defected to the West in 1961. After noting his family particulars, the dossier entry says:

"While on tour in France on June 16, 1961, he betrayed his country. In 1962, the Leningrad City Court sentenced him to seven year's deprivation of freedom. He lives in London."

Another entry lists Nina V. Paranyuk, a ship stewardess, who fled at Melbourne, Australia, in 1956. The entry says that she was "sentenced to death July 26, 1957."

Security System Effective

In the prevailing Western view, the K.G.B. has proved highly effective in maintaining security in the Soviet Union—to the degree, as a specialist said, that Western intelligence agencies have "never penetrated the Politburo" and have only "gotten close to the Central Committee" of the Communist party.

It has also kept dissidence in the armed forces at a minimum. The most recent K.G.B. defector appeared in February, 1974, was a captain of military counterintelligence assigned to the Sixth Armored Guards Division in East Germany, "Dissidence doesn't exist," he said.

Among the uses that Leonid I. Brezhnev the party chief, has for the K.G.B. is its daily summary of "vital events" in technology, science, economics, defense and political affairs. Once a week, the K.G.B. secretariat also provides the leadership with a "broader view" of domestic and international affairs.

The K.G.B. has an elaborate apparatus for dealing with civilian dissidents, the so-called Fifth Chief Directorate, with subsections assigned to Jews, young people, intellectuals and religious figures.

Intimidation of the political effectiveness abroad declines dissidents over the last four

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years has largely eliminated the problem for the time being, in the view of Western specialists.

It is in the foreign field where the K.G.B. is considered somewhat less effective than in the past, despite the large number of agents it has in the field and the high quality of many of them.

"The great successes of the K.G.B. were in the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-forties, when they had ideological recruits," a Western analyst commented. "Now revolutionary élan is dead and Soviet life is marked by increased bureaucracy."

This, too, is seen as a reason for the relatively high number of K.G.B. defectors.

As an example, Western specialists quote Vladimir N. Sakharov, a K.G.B. agent who defected to the West in 1971 after having served four years in Middle East posts.

Mr. Sakharov told the C.I.A. officers who dealt with him that once, when he had written an objective analysis of the Egyptian political scene that did not correspond in all details with the official Soviet view, his superior remarked:

"You have a brilliant career. Take that back and write it so that they can understand it at home."

In the powerful Western industrial countries—chiefly the United States and West Germany—K.G.B. officers are also under instruction to wield "political influence" wherever they can.

A correspondent of The New York Times in Bonn reports that the agents work under the guise of diplomats, trade officials or journalists to cultivate private relationships with politicians and businessmen—the purpose being to "convey Soviet views and warnings" on critical issues.

Posed as a Journalist

An official of the Krupp concern, which has millions of dollars in trade with the Soviet Union, spoke of one such intelligence officer posing as a journalist: "I like to talk to him because he makes no secret at all of whom he really works for. You know that anything you tell him goes straight to the Lubyanka [K.G.B. headquarters]."

It is telling, perhaps, that few of the K.G.B. men who have come over to the West manage to make headway in the new lives arranged for them, despite their abilities as espionage agents.

"We set them up in business and they go bankrupt," a Western analyst remarked. "Most of them can't handle being alone and on their own."

In K.G.B. usage, the United States remains the "main adversary"—as it has been since the collapse of Nazi Germany.

This is reflected in such statistics as 800 attempts to recruit American citizens for espionage purposes over the last 10 years—most of them outside the United States. It is also evident in the tremendous amount of attention paid by the K.G.B. to acquisition of military, industrial and scientific secrets, the analysts said.

The K.G.B. formed a scientific-technical directorate in 1962 and recruited science and engineering graduates to staff it. It employs 500 to 600 officers abroad, many of them in the United States.

Concerning the more James Bondish aspects of espionage work, the Soviet secret service has been credited with perfecting ingenious coding systems, tiny assassination weapons and listening devices to promote covert operations. But Western specialists believe the KGB is still basically agent-oriented and remains far behind the C.I.A. in technology.

There is no evidence that it has displayed any of the scientific daring, technical know-how or financial risk comparable to the successful C.I.A. effort to recover part of a sunken Soviet submarine last summer in the Pacific northwest of Hawaii. That venture, involving a salvage vessel specially built by Howard Hughes enterprises, is said to have cost more than \$350-million.

Nor is there anything in the ambitious Soviet submarine-development program comparable to the electronic surveillance missions of United States Navy submarines, which are said to have tapped Soviet coastal communications cables, monitoring on-shore missile firings and identified individual Soviet submarines by their sound patterns.

As for covert operations abroad, the K.G.B. maintains a strong capability, in the estimate of Western analysts.

Among the most recent K.G.B. involvements in insurgencies were in Portugal's African territories in Cambodia and Laos, and in the Dhofar region of Oman. Potential guerrillas are recruited by the K.G.B. and then passed on to the G.R.U.—the Soviet military intelligence service—for training.

The K.G.B. maintains a very large operation in Thailand, a New York Times correspondent reports, presumably to control operations throughout Indochina.

Must Wait on the Porch

Visitors to the Soviet Embassy, where the K.G.B. has its offices, are asked to wait on the front porch and staff members come out to meet them. Western intelligence operatives assume the 15-member Soviet trade delegation in Bangkok consists primarily of K.G.B. officers since Thai-Soviet trade amounted to \$6-million last year. The rent and services for the trade delegation are estimated at \$500,000 annually.

Since 1958, the Thai Government has expelled nine Soviet officials after they had been identified by Western intelligence agencies as K.G.B. officers.

Western analysts believe the K.G.B. has abandoned its practice of "wet affairs"—the Soviet euphemism for covert actions like assassinations.

According to Oleg A. Lyalin, a "wet affairs" specialist who defected in Britain in 1971 causing the expulsion of 105 Soviet spies, the K.G.B. halted its political assassination program in 1959. But Mr. Lyalin said that the K.G.B. retained plans for assassination and sabotage of vital installations in the event of a war threat.

In the opinion of Western specialists, the K.G.B. has received orders from Mr. Brezhnev not to undertake any operations that would compromise or undermine his policy of relaxing tensions with the United States and other Western countries.

Close to 10,000 Soviet and Eastern European trade representatives visited the U.S. last year, as against 1,249 in 1964. There are 45 Soviet students here, and 50 other scholars are engaged on research projects. The number of Soviet-bloc seamen arriving in American ports has risen from 1,300 to 13,000 since 1964.

An area in which the K.G.B. continues to excel, especially in less developed countries, involves "disinformation," the practice of misleading people with forged documents and the planting of distorted information in the press.

For a dozen years, it is said, the K.G.B. has financed a political weekly in India called Blitz, which disseminates propaganda damaging to the United States.

Another fairly recent change in K.G.B. priorities noted here is increased emphasis on China-watching. It formed a special China department about 1970. The K.G.B. has a network of "old China hands," and is sending young recruits to Ang Yang University in Singapore to learn Chinese, but it is evidently weak on reliable intelligence about China, the analysts said.

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